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CHAPTER 34
The Brazilian National Truth Commission 
(2012–2014) as a State-Commissioned  
History Project
Nina Schneider and Gisele Iecker de Almeida
Focusing on the Brazilian National Truth Commission (2012–2014; hereaf-
ter: NTC), this chapter asks what this empirical case reveals about the pro-
cesses and outcomes of state-commissioned history in the particular form of 
a truth commission. To what extent may the Brazilian example serve to chal-
lenge accepted concepts and assumptions about state-commissioned history?
In order to answer these questions, we focus on the variety of mechanisms of 
state control from the formulation of the law that established its legal mandate 
in 2011 to the months following the commission’s formal extinction in Decem-
ber 2014. In the Brazilian case, the state tried to restrain the commission’s work 
from the outset through subtle legal, political and financial means. On a few 
occasions, NTC commissioners and civil society organizations found ingenious 
ways to overcome these limitations, whereas at other times the barriers proved 
insurmountable. These instances of circumventing state control demand a more 
sophisticated reading of truth commissions, one that recognizes the dichotomy 
between the state and civil society in all its complexity. Within this more com-
plex reading, state-commissioned historical writing can best be conceptualized as 
© The Author(s) 2018 
B. Bevernage and N. Wouters (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored 
History After 1945, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95306-6_34
N. Schneider (*) 
Global South Study Center (GSSC), University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
G.I. de Almeida 
Department of History, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
638  N. SCHNEIDER AND G.I. DE ALMEIDA
a process that involves several state and non-state protagonists who interact and 
negotiate with each other.1 This chapter provides a very brief critical introduc-
tion to the NTC’s outputs, and offers a preliminary assessment of the NTC’s 
short- and medium-term impact on what is known as “national historiography” 
and “collective memory.”2
Before we can analyze to what extent and by what mechanisms the Bra-
zilian state sought to control the NTC, we need to problematize briefly the 
state as a category of analysis. After a decade of completely ignoring the dic-
tatorial past (1985–1995), various state actors in Brazil—who represent a far 
from homogeneous interest group—have been grappling with the question 
of what kind of official memory politics to adopt. Since 2008, in particular, 
contrasting opinions among civil servants about whether to address the past 
and if so how to do it, have come to the fore.3 To provide a key example, one 
of the most contentious points has been the punishment of perpetrators. To 
this day, the 1979 Amnesty Law is used to shield former officials involved in 
state violence from criminal prosecution (not a single perpetrator has yet been 
punished in Brazil). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss 
who has or not demanded that the state address the dictatorial past ( Schneider 
2013), it is important to bear in mind that when we use the term “state” 
we are dealing with a complex and multiform entity that to a certain extent 
remains an abstract category. As becomes clear in this chapter, the Brazilian 
state is heterogeneous in nature, a body comprised of agents with diverging 
objectives.
The ConTexT of The nTC’s emergenCe
In 1964, a military coup took place in Brazil, marking the start of an authori-
tarian regime that violated the human rights of tens of thousands of citi-
zens. After the return to formal democracy in 1985, successive democratic 
governments avoided addressing the country’s violent past, and reaffirmed 
their commitment to the so-called “transitional pact.” This pact, supposedly 
devised to reinstate democracy by balancing the demands for truth and justice 
from organized civil society with appeasing conservative sectors of society and 
the military has effectively protected perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Thus, in the years following redemocratization, scant attention has been paid 
to the human rights crimes committed by agents of the state.
In order to understand the context of its emergence, it is important to 
remember that the NTC was preceded by both private and official initia-
tives designed to provide a narrative of the dictatorship. The 1985 report 
Brasil Nunca Mais (“Brazil: Never Again,” BNM) first documented the 
systematic use of torture during the military dictatorship.4 This landmark 
project coordinated by the Catholic Church was based on documents per-
taining to military trials secretly copied during the regime. The first offi-
cial report on state-sponsored violence was only published years later 
(Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos 2007) and largely drew upon 
34 THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION (2012–2014) …  639
investigations conducted by the families of victims. Both initiatives are 
acknowledged in the NTC report. Another key resource for NTC research-
ers (Comissão Nacional da Verdade 2013, p. 3) was the work of the fed-
eral Amnesty Commission, the Brazilian organ responsible for financial and 
moral reparations. Since 2002 the Amnesty Commission has decided upon 
individual cases of financial compensation and collected substantial evidence 
of human rights violations committed during the dictatorship (Abrão and 
Torelly 2011). The case files of thousands of individuals who applied for 
reparations are expected to be integrated into a new archive and museum 
currently under construction in the city of Belo Horizonte, the Amnesty 
Memorial.
For nearly three decades, the Brazilian state refused to heed calls for a 
systematic and state-led investigative project, and only reluctantly conceded 
under a complex set of external and domestic pressures. The primary source 
of external pressure came from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR), a supranational body that in late 2010 condemned the Brazilian 
state for crimes committed during the dictatorship in the Araguaia region. 
This ruling classified them as crimes against humanity and, as such, Brazil is 
obliged to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators. From that perspective, 
the NTC can be portrayed as a diplomatic project with the primary goal of 
appeasing the international human rights community rather than clarifying 
crimes, rehabilitating victims, and writing a new “national history” (Schneider 
2013). International recognition is vital, because Brazil has recently been 
striving to raise its profile within international politics, including making a 
bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations’ Security Council. In addi-
tion, the international human rights community has been promoting truth 
commissions as part of a larger accountability movement. This global trend 
towards accountability (famously dubbed the “justice cascade” by Kathryn 
Sikkink 2011) has been accompanied by the rise of truth commissions as a 
model institution with which to address violent pasts, a development that 
may have increased the pressure on the Brazilian state.
Domestic demands mostly came from the families of victims and human 
rights activists who had been campaigning for truth and accountability for 
decades (Santos MacDowell et al. 2009; Mezarobba 2007; Teles 2001). 
Pressure on the state mounted from approximately the mid-2000s onwards 
when demands received the backing of key protagonists from within the state, 
probably influenced by global accountability discourses and norms ( Schneider 
2014). Members of the Amnesty Commission have frequently collabo-
rated with international scholars and practitioners promoting accountability 
measures and the spread of international human rights law. To summarize, 
nearly three decades after the formal return to democracy, the NTC was 
formed as a result of a lengthy negotiation process rather than an immedi-
ate concerted response at the moment of political transition. The fami-
lies of victims had long struggled for human rights crimes to be  clarified, 
however, the NTC only emerged once their demands were supported by 
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pro-accountability officials within the state apparatus and the international 
human rights community (the IACHR, the United Nations and nongovern-
mental organizations).
sTaTe ConTrol from The ouTseT
In the Brazilian case, the state constrained the work of the NTC from the 
outset by the very process of its formal institution. The commission was to be 
ratified by Congress rather than formally inaugurated by presidential decree, 
yet even its installation was contested among different groups within the state 
(civil servants within the legislative, judiciary and executive bodies; political 
parties; and the armed forces). Consequently, the initial law proposal had to 
be amended and watered down in order to secure its approval ( Schneider 
2011a). Its legal mandate was therefore shaped by the political pressure to 
ensure the law’s ratification. To provide an example, condemnatory terms 
such as “political repression” were replaced with the more neutral “political 
conflict.”
The state reduced both the material and temporal scope of the commis-
sion’s powers of inquiry in the legal mandate (Brazil 2011, Law No. 12.528), 
which decreed that seven commissioners would have two years to investi-
gate gross violations of human rights committed between 1946 and 1988, 
a period that extended beyond that of the dictatorship (1964–1985). It 
seems likely that the timeframe for investigation was deliberately widened to 
appease the military, but it meant that, from the outset, the focus of the com-
mission was unclear. The extended timeframe also put a strain on the human 
resources (seven commissioners) required for a project of this scale. Most 
commissioners (five) were legal experts, but historians, investigative journal-
ists and experts for the Armed Forces were conspicuously absent.5 The des-
ignated period of two years (eventually extended by seven months) proved 
insufficient to allow for a thorough investigation of all the human rights 
violations committed in a country of continental proportions. However, 
the NTC overcame that limitation by declaring soon after the investigation 
was launched that it would focus solely on the dictatorship years. A further 
restriction lay in the fact that the NTC was not given any time to prepare 
for its work, and took about a year just to develop a modus operandi and set 
up a support team.6 The initial lack of a permanent co-ordinator prevented 
the adoption of a consistent working strategy. The mandate specified tangible 
targets by prioritizing research into the crimes of torture, executions, forced 
disappearances, the concealment of remains and identifying the bodies of the 
disappeared as well as uncovering the institutions, locations and state repre-
sentatives involved in those crimes. Neither civil society collaboration nor the 
private funding of repressive organs was included in this remit.
The mandate was imprecise in relation to key points. Once again, the 
strategy of omitting the most controversial issues served to ensure the law’s 
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ratification by Congress. It was unclear, for example, whether it fell within 
the commission’s remit to investigate crimes committed by opponents of the 
regime, and so the commissioners themselves took the decision. The commis-
sion declared that it would only investigate violations by state officials, but 
would not re-examine cases already dealt with by other bodies such as the 
Amnesty Commission.
The mandate not only limited the NTC’s elaboration of a state-commis-
sioned historical account, but also provided the legal tools to facilitate its 
research work: the two most important being a clause compelling public sec-
tor workers (civilians and military) to co-operate with the commission, and 
the Freedom of Information Act (LAI), passed on the same day as the NTC 
law. The LAI established that any documentation relating to human rights 
abuses must be declassified, and would later provide NTC commissioners 
with the legal framework to demand the handover of documents. As she inau-
gurated these laws, President Rousseff highlighted their joint contribution 
towards the “consolidation of Brazilian democracy.”7
Despite the legal provisions, one of the main problems faced by the NTC 
was that certain state actors refused to abide by these rules, yet another illus-
tration of the divergence between state agents. While the institutions of the 
Armed Forces refused to comply with the law and provide evidence relat-
ing to the location of the bodies of the disappeared, the NTC—ultimately, a 
state organ itself—unsuccessfully tried to obtain that information from mili-
tary officials. Although a discussion of the military’s refusal to co-operate falls 
beyond the scope of this chapter, it can be said that the armed forces consist-
ently failed to provide the missing pieces of information necessary to locate 
bodies and clarify the circumstances of death.8 As the NTC coordinator 
Pedro Dallari repeatedly stated, the armed forces always formally responded 
to the NTC’s requests, but the information provided was superficial and 
occasionally contradictory or false.9
Beyond sTaTe ConTrol: The ImpaCT of CIvIl soCIeTy
From the outset, the NTC was subject to criticism by nonstate actors from 
within civil society, the media and, to a more limited extent, academia (Sch-
neider 2013). Here, we focus on conceivably the most important actor: the 
varied and heterogeneous civil-society organizations. Those who did not 
reject the NTC from the beginning, as did the leading NGO Tortura Nunca 
Mais (“Torture Never Again”), for example responded by launching local 
commissions. Brazil thus pioneered a system of local truth commissions that 
is a new development in the history of truth commissions.10 The dynamics 
between the local and the national commission were case-specific and devel-
oped over time. Many local commissions supported and provided information 
to the NTC and broadened the scope of its work, however, others challenged 
and contested its findings.11 Many of the local commissions later formalized 
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their partnership with the NTC. Among the organizations that formed local 
commissions and actively engaged in gathering information about the dicta-
torship period were universities, municipal and regional government bodies, 
as well as trade unions. It is thus vital to acknowledge that the final report 
of the NTC—as a state-commissioned national history—is unique, for it 
emerged from a dialogue with the local truth commissions, many of them run 
by civilians. The Brazilian case of state-commissioned history writing is also 
peculiar because the National Truth Commission (a state organ at the federal 
level) was complemented and, to some extent, contested by local commis-
sions at the regional or municipal state level.
A prime example of a dispute between the national commission and a 
local state-level commission involved the Vladimir Herzog municipal truth 
commission of São Paulo, which raised doubts about the circumstances of 
death of former president Juscelino Kubitschek. Commonly believed to be 
caused by a car accident, following a number of hearings and an analysis of 
evidence collected in 1996, the local commission reached the conclusion 
that Kubitschek was in fact murdered in a politically motivated crime.12 The 
NTC final report rejected the findings of the local commission and argued 
that the homicide thesis lacked sufficient proof (Comissão Nacional da Ver-
dade 2014, p. 75).13 The conflict escalated and a judicial order was filed in 
2014 that accused the national commission of abusing its power. Following 
the denial of its request by a federal court, the local commission criticized 
the NTC for upholding the narrative of JK’s death as an accident, a story 
forged during the military period, and for “closing the debate on JK’s death” 
(Gombata 2014). The incident illustrates certain things: first, that differ-
ent state-level commissions (imbued with varying levels of state authority) 
fiercely disputed how the official history of the dictatorship ought to be told; 
and second, that although state-sponsored commissions may narrow the 
range of permissible lies (as Ignatieff 1996, p. 113 reminds us), they may 
also reinforce long-held myths.
The ouTCome and possIBle ImpaCT
The NTC produced a variety of immediate outputs including the final report; 
a well-documented webpage with hyperlinks to documents, video and audio 
recordings, and archival material gathered by the NTC, which will be inte-
grated into the Brazilian National Archives. If outputs not commissioned by 
the state are also taken into consideration, a larger set includes the reports of 
local commissions, artistic and cultural events in response to the NTC and the 
media coverage of the truth commission.14 Here we focus our attention on 
the two most important state outputs: the collection and disclosure of archi-
val material; and the final report with its recommendations.
The NTC generated archive material that includes documents pertaining 
to its own inner workings and to the recent history of the country, either 
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in the form of historical material retrieved during its research or in the form 
of video footage of public hearings.15 This material is expected to be further 
scrutinized and should herald a renewed interest in the history of the dicta-
torship period. The head of the NTC’s historical research team, Heloísa Star-
ling, expects a paradigm shift in Brazilian historiography in the coming years, 
and reports that a large number of documents have been unearthed by the 
commission.16
The NTC’s main output, however, is its 3383-page final report, which is 
divided into three volumes:
• The first volume is a collective text signed by all six commissioners. It 
includes a historical overview of the military period and an analysis of 
the crimes perpetrated by agents of the state. It reveals the military chain 
of command and is the first published source to link the crimes to high-
ranking officials, including Brazilian presidents.
• The second volume presents findings that either derived from the com-
mission’s working groups or external experts. This collection of essays 
highlights new topics such as crimes against women, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons or the indigenous and rural 
populations. No consensus was reached for these findings among the 
commissioners, hence their relegation to the second volume.
• The third volume offers a case-by-case analysis of crimes committed 
against political dissidents. It presents 434 cases and lists the names of 
377 perpetrators. Both numbers are conservative estimates, and are 
expected to increase if further research is undertaken.
The privileged position given to those who were killed or disappeared for 
political reasons has long been the subject of public debate. Some critics have 
raised the question of whether the NTC has used too narrow a concept of 
victimhood and reinforced the notion that the victims consisted only of those 
434 individuals. The Brazilian historian Carlos Fico has repeatedly pointed 
out that the NTC has focused mostly on high-profile cases, and thereby lost 
the opportunity to stress the wider impact of the dictatorship on the lives of 
ordinary citizens (Arakiki and Kmitta 2014; Martins 2014). The number of 
citizens tortured, raped or illegally imprisoned is not estimated in the report. 
On the other hand, it is praiseworthy that the NTC denounced violence 
against Brazil’s indigenous populations during the dictatorship for the first 
time, even if the issue appears only in the report’s second volume.
Overall, the NTC made 29 recommendations, many of which denounce 
the persistence of human rights violations (Comissão Nacional da Verdade 
2014, p. 964). The recommendations are divided into three sections: insti-
tutional measures (17 recommendations), constitutional and legal reform (8 
recommendations) and follow-up measures (4 recommendations).
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Although the state has not yet addressed the report’s key recommen-
dations, it is currently responding to some of the less central ones. The 
“happy coincidence” of those recommendations that had already been par-
tially addressed upon the release of the NTC’s report should not, however, 
be interpreted as a sign of success. Rather, the report highlights actions that 
were already being carried out by the state.17 No new action has ensued as a 
result of the report, hence its direct policy impact has been nonexistent.
The NTC’s first recommendation is that the armed forces acknowledge 
their responsibility for the gross human rights violations between 1964 and 
1985 (Comissão Nacional da Verdade 2014, p. 964). Commissioners have 
criticized the military’s institutional silence on countless occasions. The NTC 
argued that without the armed forces officially acknowledging its past acts of 
violence, Brazil’s reconciliation process would remain incomplete.
Next, the commission recommended the suspension of the blanket 
amnesty for crimes against humanity under the 1977 Amnesty Law (Comis-
são Nacional da Verdade 2014, p. 965). The illegality of that law had already 
been established by the IACHR, and it was to be expected that the NTC 
would reinforce this interpretation. What remains to be seen is whether this 
contentious policy will be upheld. The Brazilian Supreme Court intends to 
review the legality of the Amnesty Law in response to the IACHR’s 2010 rul-
ing against the country.
Nowhere is the emphasis on current human rights violations clearer than 
in the recommendations concerning public security, which include sugges-
tions for reforms in the armed forces, law enforcement and the criminal jus-
tice system. They range from changes in internal regulations, recruitment 
(recommendation 5, p. 967) and military education (recommendation 6, 
p. 967) to the formal separation of certain services (such as the institute of 
forensic medicine [recommendation 10, p. 968] or the decoupling of military 
and state police [recommendation 20, p. 971]).
Finally, the commission recommended the creation of a body to oversee 
the implementation of the recommendations (Comissão Nacional da Verdade 
2014, p. 973). This crucial follow-up step could make a permanent difference 
to whether the NTC recommendations are enforced by the state authorities.
ConTenT and form of The fInal reporT
Focusing on the report itself rather than its conditions of production, we now 
offer three preliminary statements relating to: the report’s content (historical 
fact-finding), its impact on what is commonly labeled “collective memory,” 
and its overall narrative form and style. In relation to its content, we agree 
with the assessment of most scholars and activists that the report offers lit-
tle in terms of new information. Rather, it seems largely based on previous 
human rights accounts such as the 2007 report of the Special Commission. 
From a historian’s perspective and with regard to the expectation that this 
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state-sponsored history project should contribute to historical fact-finding, 
the report can be said to make only a limited contribution to knowledge 
about the dictatorship. This, however, seems to have been due less to faults 
within the commission itself, but more a result of the military’s refusal to 
cooperate. It should also be borne in mind that historical fact-finding might 
not have been the NTC’s primary goal (Schneider 2013). Nonetheless, it is 
remarkable that the report makes hardly any reference to research conducted 
by professional historians. Starting in the 1990s and increasingly since the 
new millennium, the military dictatorship has been the subject of numerous 
historical studies.18 The lack of references to academic historiography seems 
to suggest that the NTC did not study the subject matter (the conditions 
under which the report was written cannot be scrutinized here, but lack of 
time and human resources would seem a plausible explanation). For all these 
reasons we suspect that the report’s impact on the historiography of the mili-
tary regime will be limited.
Concerning collective memory, the report denounces a number of myths 
about the military dictatorship that have continued to prevail. It deconstructs 
the portrayal by the military institution of a “war” provoked by the Left and 
clearly argues that state-sponsored violence took place right from the outset 
of the military period. Crucially, the report refutes the military’s claim that 
state violence was carried out without the knowledge of high-ranking offi-
cials. On the contrary, it confirms that human rights violations were part of a 
systematic policy by the Brazilian state (Comissão Nacional da Verdade 2014, 
pp. 962–963). If the report were to be read widely, it may have a significant 
impact; yet, as we argue in the remainder of the chapter, the dissemination 
and circulation of the report has thus far been modest.
Regarding the overall narrative form and style, critics may claim that the 
voluminous report is too long and, perhaps more important, that the use of 
legal jargon (at least in the first volume) makes it a challenging read that a 
wider audience could find intimidating. Probably due to a lack of editorial 
consensus, the final report does not contain an Executive Summary. This sug-
gests that the report was not written with a mass audience in mind. Critics 
may argue that other truth commissions have shown greater commitment 
to releasing more accessible reports: the Argentine Comisión Nacional sobre 
la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) report became a bestseller when 
published in book format in 1984 (similar to the BNM report of 1985), the 
Sierra Leonean Commission (2004) developed a version for schools, and the 
2015 Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission report offers a reader-
friendly Executive Summary.
Many points of criticism (both positive and negative) have also been raised 
by national and international commentators. National media coverage was 
relatively extensive by Brazilian standards, and acknowledged the contribu-
tion of the NTC’s work.19 The most important daily newspapers reprinted 
the commission’s key findings and recommendations, and the report’s release 
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was even headline news. It received a mixed reception from victim groups, 
but on the whole their views were more positive than initially expected. Most 
praised the fact that the commission had completed its work and produced a 
report. In 2014, the NTC faced a major internal crisis leaving many observ-
ers to doubt that it would survive the two-year period, let alone produce a 
report. Most surviving victims welcomed the recommendations, the fact that 
the report named names and included the chain of command, and praised the 
official acknowledgment of systematic state violence. However, many disa-
greed with the conservative estimates of the numbers of victims and perpetra-
tors, complaining that names of proven torturers had been omitted from the 
report, and found it too conservative overall. Some victim organizations such 
as Torture Never Again openly expressed their disappointment.
The international human rights community praised Brazil’s efforts and the 
NTC’s report. A member of the IACHR, José Henríquez, hailed it as “a fun-
damental step to reach truth regarding human rights violations in the recent 
past” (IACHR 2015). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid 
Ra’ad Al Hussein commended the commission’s report, but pointed out that 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity cannot be protected by amnesty laws, 
an allusion to Brazil’s lack of response to the 2010 condemnation by the 
IACHR.
To hypothesize about the report’s impact is very challenging because it is 
not an exact science. As many scholars have argued (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 
2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010), we lack quantitative or qualitative methods 
with which to measure the impact of truth commissions, and the few studies 
available on this topic are inconclusive.20 However, two of the most reliable 
indicators of a commission’s impact are to what extent its recommendations 
have been implemented, and whether it has generated (or even shifted the 
focus of) public debate.
To their credit, the commissioners were sufficiently independent to crit-
icize the Brazilian state for its systematic involvement in human rights vio-
lations. The problem was not so much the content of the final report (the 
aforementioned criticisms notwithstanding), but rather, the report’s limited 
circulation and the state’s complete failure to respond to the recommen-
dations, let alone comply with them, yet another means of exerting state 
control.
Empirical evidence from Brazil seems to suggest that the question of what 
may be called “discursive formation” (Foucault 2002)—the power entailed in 
whether to disseminate a narrative or silence it, and of whether recommen-
dations are carried out—is central when analyzing the impact and relevance 
of state-sponsored history initiatives. It was in this respect that the Brazil-
ian government most visibly displayed its power by completely ignoring the 
report, failing to issue any kind of public response to it or to enforce its rec-
ommendations. It also did nothing to ensure that this state-commissioned 
and partly revisionary national history reached a wide audience.21
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With regard to the report’s lack of circulation, however, we have to distin-
guish between two levels of responsibility. First, although the NTC has ful-
filled its duty in making the report freely available online, the text is not being 
actively promoted and distributed in the form of a public awareness cam-
paign.22 Second, circulation depends on the existence of an interested audi-
ence providing a demand for the product. The majority of Brazilians appear 
to have little interest in human rights violations and efforts to raise public 
awareness of this topic have been very limited.
At this point, civilians have intervened in the debate by organizing pub-
lic events and inviting former NTC staff to give talks explaining the content 
of the archival material sent to the National Archives. Human rights activists 
(including both state officials and civilians) are currently developing ways to 
encourage wider discussion of the report and promote its content, particu-
larly within educational and academic institutions.23
ConClusIon
What, to conclude, does the Brazilian National Truth Commission reveal 
about processes and outcomes of state-commissioned history in the particu-
lar form of a truth commission? Empirical evidence from Brazil challenges a 
series of assumptions about state-commissioned history and raises new ques-
tions: first, is the primary purpose of a truth commission report to try to 
establish a new national history, or to officially acknowledge formerly silenced 
public crimes, and to what extent is a TC merely a cosmetic fix? In order 
to answer this question, it seems that the importance of circulating the find-
ings cannot be underestimated, and ought to be included in any analysis of 
state-commissioned history projects as well as the question of the state cen-
soring and shaping content. Second, is a truth commission authoritative or 
can its recommendations be completely ignored, as in the case of Brazil (at 
least as of April 2016, the time of writing)? Again, this shows that the “state” 
is composed of officials with varying political views; whereas some ideas 
and practices are supported and developed within the state apparatus, oth-
ers are ultimately barred. Conceptually, the Brazilian case has helped to pro-
vide a more nuanced understanding of state-commissioned history projects. 
Although the NTC has been shaped and limited by various mechanisms of 
state control (legal mandate, refusal to grant access to military sources) since 
its inception, the commissioners have succeeded in circumventing certain 
constraints and the commission has, over time, been able to navigate its way 
around the obstacles placed in its path. Importantly, the NTC and its report 
resulted from a complex and dynamic process of negotiation between state 
officials with divergent views and the local commissions, both of which also 
had to respond to demands from civil society.
This chapter has argued that a more differentiated understanding of the 
state is crucial, as specific state representatives (e.g., the armed forces) refused 
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to abide by the law. During the ratification process the law proposal was 
diluted, because sectors of the military disagreed with its content and the 
proposal had to be approved by Congress. The commissioners themselves 
disagreed over the appropriate strategy to pursue, and hence negotiated with 
other state institutions, most important, the armed forces. Upon the publica-
tion of its final report, the NTC argued that without the armed forces offi-
cially acknowledging its past acts of violence, Brazil’s reconciliation process 
would remain incomplete. The municipal truth commission of São Paulo 
launched a federal lawsuit against the NTC disputing the commonly accepted 
historical version of JK’s death. All these examples show that the state (and 
hence state-commissioned history) is a complex and multiform entity and 
remains an abstract category that requires both empirical and theoretical 
scrutiny. Finally, the Brazilian case shows that the processes and outcomes of 
state-commissioned history can be significantly shaped by non-state actors. 
Whether the report will have a long-term impact on Brazilian “national” his-
tory writing or collective memory will largely depend on civil society: on its 
social movements, educational professionals, intellectuals, and artists.
noTes
 1.  The Brazilian case confirms the findings of previous studies, notably, Elizabeth 
Jelin’s work on Argentina (2007) and Steve Stern’s study on Chile (2006) 
that likewise highlighted the dynamic and contingent nature of justice-seeking 
processes.
 2.  The term “collective memory”, introduced by Maurice Halbwachs, emphasizes 
the collectively forged, mediated memory of a society. For a thorough debate, 
see Assmann (2006, pp. 29–36).
 3.  The reasons for this shift are complex: see Mezarobba (2007), Schneider 
(2011b, 2014), SEDH (2007).
 4.  The documentation has meanwhile been published online and is available at: 
http://bnmdigital.mpf.mp.br/. Accessed 4 February 2016. An English ver-
sion was published as Archdiocese of São Paulo. 1998. Torture in Brazil. Aus-
tin: University of Texas.
 5.  Rousseff appointed the following respected members of society to the com-
mission: Rosa Maria Cardoso, José Paulo Cavalcanti, José Carlos Dias, Gilson 
Dipp, Claudio Fonteles, Maria Rita Kehl and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. In May 
2013, after being on medical leave for over seven months, Dipp left the NTC 
and was never replaced. In June 2013 Fonteles quit over internal conflicts 
regarding the commission’s methodology: the group disagreed over whether 
to present only its findings in the final report or to expose the process as a 
whole, including public hearings and civil society participation. Fonteles was 
replaced in September by Pedro Dallari (who was pivotal as coordinator of the 
NTC towards the end of the mandate).
 6.  By the end of the first year, the commissioners were responsible for overseeing 
the work of about 70 researchers and 14 consultants, who were organized in 
thematic working groups (ISER 2013, pp. 35 and 96).
 7.  Rousseff at the ceremony announcing the NTC, Brasilia, 18 November 2011.
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 8.  For more information on the relation between the commissioners and the 
armed forces, see Mezarobba (2015) and Figueiredo (2015).
 9.  Official speech by Dallari at the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) on 10 Decem-
ber 2014.
 10.  In a complex development that has yet to be studied in depth, local truth com-
missions quickly spread throughout the country. At the time the NTC report 
was drafted, there were over 100 such commissions (Comissão Nacional da 
Verdade 2014, p. 23). These local processes have followed their own time-
line, continuing or even starting their work long after the delivery of the NTC 
report.
 11.  Twenty-nine local commissions signed co-operation agreements with the NTC 
(Comissão Nacional da Verdade 2014, p. 10).
 12.  The evidence consisted of metallic material in the cranial area of the coffin of 
the former president’s driver. The local commission maintains it could be the 
remnants of a bullet, while the NTC maintains that it came from the nails in 
the coffin.
 13.  See also: CNV online (2015).
 14.  See Rebecca Atencio’s, “Beyond Official Truth-Telling: Bernardo Kucinski’s 
Fiction and Its Real-World Synergies with the National and Local Truth Com-
missions in Brazil,” presented at the symposium The Brazilian National Truth 
Commission in the Context of Latin America: Local, National, and Global Per-
spectives by the Volkswagen Foundation held in Hannover, Germany, Octo-
ber 15–17, 2015. Available at: https://brtruthcommission.wordpress.com. 
Accessed 10 November 2015.
 15.  Documents include exchanges with the armed forces and other truth-seeking 
bodies such as the Amnesty Commission, publications in the Official Fed-
eral Gazette (Diário Oficial da União), communications sent by civilians to 
the NTC, and more mundane items such as employment contracts and other 
documents relating to staff and their responsibilities. Also forming part of the 
NTC documental footprint are the websites created for the communication 
of its activities (most importantly, the Web portal www.cnv.gov.br) and two-
way communication with the public, such as the commission’s Facebook page. 
PhD candidate Ana Migowski (University of Giessen, Germany) is currently 
developing a study on the NTC’s use of social media.
 16.  Interview with H. Starling on December 4, 2014 by Gisele Iecker de Almeida. 
The archival fund amassed by the NTC is expected to be integrated into the 
Brazilian National Archives, which received the first set of 47,000 items in July 
2015.
 17.  Some examples of recommendations already partially or fully addressed by the 
state before the NTC report was published include the prohibition of official 
celebrations of the 1964 coup (a ruling made by Rousseff in early 2014); the 
inclusion of human rights both in the national curriculum (recommendation 
16, p. 970) and in the military academy (recommendation 6, p. 967), and the 
call for the creation of a museum and other sites of memory (recommendation 
28, p. 974). Anthony Pereira presented a paper entitled “The Truth Commis-
sion and Institutional Reform” on this topic in the aforementioned symposium 
organized by the Volkswagen Foundation. Available at: https://brtruthcom-
mission.wordpress.com. Accessed 10 November 2015.
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 18.  For recent historiographical overviews see: Araujo (2015), and Ridenti (2016).
 19.  By contrast, media coverage of the first accountability measure, the 1995 Law 
of the Disappeared, was minimal. See Schneider (2014, pp. 69–71).
 20.  Currently, Leigh Payne and Kathryn Sikkink (and team) are producing a joint 
database and will shortly be publishing new quantitative findings on the effects 
of truth commissions.
 21.  A narrative that explicitly assumes state responsibility for systematic violence up 
to and including the president’s office and that includes the perspectives of vic-
tim groups such as the indigenous or rural populations can be considered, at 
least in part, a revision of the official narrative.
 22.  Interviews with NTC staff conducted between 2014 and 2015 by Nina Schnei-
der have shown that many officials favored educational follow-up projects, but 
lacked financial and operational support.
 23.  For example, Carolina de Campos Melo, former leading NTC assistant and law 
professor, has been systematically discussing the report with her students. She 
commented on her work at the international symposium by the Volkswagen 
Foundation where she presented a paper entitled “The Writing up of the Final 
Report: Conclusions and Recommendations.” Available at: https://brtruth-
commission.wordpress.com. Accessed 10 November 2015.
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